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Abstract
We study a simple model for social learning agents in a restless multi-armed bandit. There are
N agents, and the bandit has M good arms that change to bad with the probability qc/N . If the
agents do not know a good arm, they look for it by a random search (with the success probability
qI) or copy the information of other agents’ good arms (with the success probability qO) with
probabilities 1 − p or p, respectively. The distribution of the agents in M good arms obeys the
Yule distribution with the power-law exponent 1 + γ in the limit N,M →∞ and γ = 1 + (1−p)qI
pqO
.
The system shows a phase transition at pc =
qI
qI+qo
. For p < pc (> pc), the variance of N1 per
agent is finite (diverges as ∝ N2−γ with N). There is a threshold value Ns for the system size that
scales as lnNs ∝ 1/(γ − 1). The expected value of the number of the agents with a good arm N1
increases with p for N > Ns. For p > pc and N < Ns, all agents tend to share only one good arm.
If the shared arm changes to be bad, it takes long time for the agents to find another good one.
E(N1) decreases to zero as p→ 1, which is referred to as the “Echo chamber.”
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, social physics has become an active research field, and many studies have been
devoted to understanding the social phenomena and interacting human behaviors [1–6]. In
the process of these studies, social learning plays the key role as a fundamental interaction
among humans [1, 2]. Here, social learning is a learning process through observing and
imitating others’ behaviors [7, 8]. In economics, the expected return or expected utility is
maximized in the modelling of human behaviors. However, in many cases, such estimation
is difficult or impossible for humans because of the limited capability of calculation and
information gathering. Rationality is bounded and humans cannot avoid the uncertainty in
decision making [9, 10]. In such uncertain situations, it is rational to observe others and copy
their choices. Social learning is easy, as the cost is lower than individual learning, where one
obtains information with one’s effort [7, 11]. Individual learning has the advantage that the
obtained information is more accurate and newer than the information obtained by social
learning. Even so, the cost of the former learning is generally very high, and this cannot be
compensated for by the accuracy of the obtained information [12].
As social learning is a process of copying information among agents and agents change
their behaviors and make decisions based on that information, this process plays the role of
interaction among agents. As the interaction is strong, the statistical mechanical approach
is promising [13, 14]. One example is the phase transition caused by the information cascade
[15, 16]. Information cascade is the tendency to choose the majority choice even if one thinks
the minority option is correct or optimal [17, 18]. In laboratory experiments, at most 63
subjects answered two-choice questions one by one after observing the previous subjects’
choices [19, 20]. The sequential choice processes were described as non-linear Po´lya urn
process. It was observed that as the difficulty of the question increases, the number of stable
states changes. The change in the number of the stable states induces a nonequilibrium
discontinuous phase transition in the infinite population limit [16]. The performance of
humans is greatly improved by social learning, and this is called the collective intelligence
effect [21, 22]. However, it can also cause suboptimal macroscopic behaviors where the
majority choice is wrong.
Many kinds of social animals undertake social learning and make collective decisions
[23, 24]. Owing to the abovementioned drawback of social learning, it is important to
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investigate when, from whom, and how one copies others. These questions have been studied
in behavioral ethology [7, 8, 25]. In 2010, a paper reported a tournament of social learning
agent programs in a restless multi-armed bandit(rMAB). A multi-armed bandit is analogous
to the “one-armed bandit” slot machine but with multiple “arms,” each with a distinct payoff
[12]. We call an arm with a high payoff a good arm. The term “restless” means that the
payoffs changes randomly. Agents maximize their payoffs by exploiting an arm, searching
for a good arm at random (individual learning), and copying an arm exploited by other
agents (social learning). In the tournament, strategies that relied heavily on social learning
were found to be remarkably successful. However, when all agents always adopt social
learning in searching an arm, the performance was very bad [12]. They do not bring in new
information, and outdated information is prevalent among them. This kind of suboptimal
state is called an “Echo chamber,” in which wrong and outdated information spreads among
agents, and the performance is severely degraded [1]. By using the data in the online trade
market e-Toro, it was reported that the excessive observation of others’ portfolios leads to
the deterioration of the performance [1].
In this paper, we study a simple model for social learning agents in an rMAB. Previous
studies focused on the optimal social learning strategy in a nonuniform and changing en-
vironment [26, 27]. Here, we focus on the collective behavior of social learning agents in
the context of statistical physics. The proposed model is deeply related with other models.
If one regards an arm as a color and an agent as a ball, it is a kind of generalized Po´lya
urn process [28]. The bad arm’s color is black, and the good arms’ colors are different from
other arms’ colors. If an agent knows an arm, the color of the ball is the color of the arm.
If an randomly chosen ball’s color is black, it is replaced with a ball with another color.
Contrary to the generalized Po´lya urn process, in an rMAB, all balls of a color change to
bad randomly. In social learning, the probability that a good arm is chosen is proportional
to the number of agents who know it. It works as a preferential attachment mechanism of
evolving networks[29, 30]. The model is also a variant of the cultural neutral model [31]. In
this context, each arm corresponds to an option, a city, a product, a song, a fashion, an idea,
etc. In the model, in each turn, a new agent is added, and this agent will copy the choices of
previous agents. Instead of the spontaneous change in the arms in an rMAB, a new option
is added, and the agent will choose this new option with a certain probability. The cultural
neutral model explains right-skew socioeconomic distributions and the continuous turnover
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observed empirically in the distributions [32, 33].
We organize the paper as follows. We introduce a simple model for social learning col-
lectives in an rMAB in Sec. II. Sec. III is devoted to the analysis for the solvable case where
the rMAB has one good arm. In Sec. IV, we study the model with multiple good arms using
the mean field approximation. The distribution of agents among good arms obeys the Yule
distribution in the infinite population and good arm limit. We also estimate a critical system
size Ns, beyond which the system is in equilibrium and the performance improves with the
rate of social learning. In Sec. V, we show that the system shows a phase transition. We
describe how the performance behaves in each phase and explain the nature of the “Echo
chamber.” Sec. VI is devoted to the conclusions and to discussing future problems.
II. MODEL
There are N agents, and the rMAB has M good arms. We label the agents by n ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N} and the good arms by m ∈ {1, 2 · · · ,M}. We identify all bad arms with the
arm m = 0. In each turn, one agent is randomly chosen, and he exploits his arm if he
knows a good one. If he does not know a good arm, he looks for it by a random search
(individual learning) or copies the information of other agents’ good arms (social learning)
with probabilities 1− p or p, respectively. In the random search, we denote the probability
that the agent successfully knows a good arm as qI . As there are M good arms, each arm
is chosen with the probability qI/M . In the copy process, he can know a good arm with
the success probability qO if there is at least one agent who knows a good one. If there are
multiple agents who know a good arm, one of them is chosen randomly. The probability
that arm m is chosen is proportional to the number of the agents who know it. After that,
good arms change to bad with the probability qc/N independently of each other. If a good
arm m changes to bad, the agents who who know it are forced to forget it and to know the
bad arm m = 0. We define one Monte Carlo step (MCS) or one round as N turns. The
probability that an arm does not change during one MCS (round) is (1− qC/N)
N ≃ e−qC .
In the agent tournament [12], agents copy the arm that is exploited in the previous
round. In each round, all N agents perform their actions. In this case, we can estimate qO
as qO ≃ (1 − qc/N)
2N ≃ e−2qC . The reasoning for this estimation is that the copied agents
exploited the arm N turns before. The information of the exploited arm was assumed to be
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updated N turns before the exploit. Since the distribution of the payoff obeys an exponential
distribution, qI is small. In this paper, we assume qI < qO.
We denote the number of agents who know arm m after t as Km(t). As we are interested
in the performance of the agents’ system, we also introduce N1(t) ≡
∑M
m=1Km(t), which is
the number of agents who know a good arm after t. The number of agents who do not know
a good arm is denoted as N0(t), and N0(t) = N −N1(t) = K0(t) holds.
In turn t, agent n is picked randomly among N agents. If this agent knows a good arm,
the agent exploits it to obtain a payoff. Otherwise, the agent copies with the probability p
and searches randomly with the probability 1− p. If N1 = 0, the agent cannot know a good
arm by copying. In terms of ~K = (K0, · · · , KM), the probability for the change ∆Km = 1
by an agent action with the condition ~K = ~k is written as
pm(~k) ≡ Pr(∆Km = 1) =
N0
N
·
(
A · (1− δN1,0) ·
km
N1
+B ·
1
M
)
. (1)
Here, A and B are defined as A ≡ pqO, B ≡ (1−p)qI . We write the probability that there is
no change in ~K by an agent action as pNC(~k) ≡ 1−
∑M
m=1 pm(
~k). We summarize the change
in ~K by the transfer matrix TA as
TA(~k′|~k) ≡ Pr( ~K = ~k → ~k′) =
(
pNC(~k)
M∏
m=1
δkm,k′m +
M∑
m=1
pm(~k)δk′m,km+1
∏
l 6=m
δk′
l
,kl
)
.
After an agent action, all good arms change to be bad with the probability qc/N indepen-
dently. If arm m changes to bad, Km becomes zero. We write the change in ~K using the
transfer matrix TC as
TC(~k′|~k) ≡ Pr( ~K = ~k → ~k′) =
M∏
m=1
(
(1−
qC
N
) · δk′m,km +
qC
N
· δk′m,0
)
.
We write the probability function for ~K(t) = ~k as P (~k, t).
P (~k|t) ≡ Pr( ~K(t) = ~k).
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The Chapman–Kolmogorov equation for P (~k|t) is
P (~k|t+ 1) =
∑
~k′
∑
~k′′
TC(~k|~k′)TA(~k′|~k′′)P (~k′′|t). (2)
Initially, no agent knows good arms, and ~K(0) = (N, 0, · · · , 0). The initial conditions for
P (~k|0) are P ((N, 0, · · · , 0)|0) = 1 and P (~k|0) = 0 for ~k 6= (N, 0, · · · , 0). If p = 1 or qI = 0,
no agent can know a good arm forever. We assume that p < 1 and qI > 0 to avoid such
trivial results.
If N is sufficiently large, the equilibrium between N1(t) and N0(t) should be realized
in the stationary state. We denote their equilibrium values as N1 ≡ limt→∞N1(t) and
N0 ≡ limt→∞N0(t), respectively. The equilibrium condition between N0 and N1 is given as
N0
N
· (A+B) = N1 ·
qC
N
. (3)
The left-hand side shows the expected number of agents who come to know a good arm,
which is given by the product of the probability that a randomly chosen agent knows a bad
arm, N0/N , and the probability that the agent succeeds in knowing a good one, A+B. If N
is large, the number of agents who know a good arm is always positive, and the probability
for successful copying is qO. The right-hand side shows the expected number of agents whose
arm changes from good to bad. We solve the condition with the constraint N0 + N1 = N ,
and we have
N1
N
=
A+B
qC + A +B
=
pqO + (1− p)qI
qC + pqO + (1− p)qI
. (4)
As we assume qI < qO, N1/N becomes an increasing function of p. In the limit p → 1,
N1/N converges to qO/(qO+ qC). As will be shown later, if p is larger than a threshold value
pc, the system size N required for maintaining the equilibrium becomes extremely large. If
N is smaller than the required value, N1(t) shows an oscillatory behavior, as the system is
trapped in the state N0 = N for a long time. The expected number of N1/N decreases with
p.
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III. EXACT SOLVABLE M = 1 CASE
When there is only one good arm, the state of the system is described by K1 = N1 =
n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. In this case, we can obtain the stationary probability function P (n) =
limt→∞ Pr(N1(t) = n) and estimate several quantities. Here, we explain some important
results. The details of the derivations are given in Appendix A.
The expectation value of N1/N is evaluated as
E(N1/N) =
1 + a/N
a+ 1
· (1− P (0)), (5)
P (0) =
qC
qC + (N − qC)B
.
In the limit N →∞, P (0)→ 0, and we obtain
lim
N→∞
E(N1/N) =
1
a+ 1
=
A +B
qC + A+B
.
The result is in accordance with the result from Eq. (4).
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FIG. 1. Plots of E(N1)/N vs. p for M = 1. We plot Eq. (5) for the plot N < ∞ and Eq. (4) for
the plot N =∞. qC = 0.3, qI = 0.1, qO = 1, and N ∈ {10, 10
2, 104,∞}.
Figure 1 shows a plot of E(N1/N) vs. p. As can be clearly seen, as N increases, the
curves for E(N1/N) converge to the curves for the results in the limit N → ∞. E(N1/N)
for finite N increases with p up to a point and then decreases with p. As N increases, the
peak point for E(N1/N) moves rightward and converges to 1 in the limit N →∞.
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To understand the mechanism for the bad performance for large p, we derive the self-
consistent equation for n1, which is the limiting value of the expectation value of N1, n1(t) ≡
E(N1(t)).
n1 = lim
t→∞
n1(t) = lim
t→∞
∑
n
P (n|t)n.
It is given as
n1
N
=
(
1−
qC
N
)
·
A +B −AP (0)
qC + (1−
qC
N
)(A +B)
. (6)
This is another expression for the result in Eq.(5). In the limit N → ∞, P (0) = 0, and
qC/N = 0. We get the same result in Eq. (4). The numerator in Eq. (6) decreases as P (0)
increases. As p→ 1 and B = (1− p)qI → 0, P (0) increases to 1, and the numerator reduces
to 0. As there is only one good arm in the system, agents are forced to share the arm. If the
arm changes to be bad, there is no agent who knows a good arm, and copying fails. If p is
large and B is small, agents cannot know a good arm for a long duration. Thus, E(N1/N)
becomes small compared with the equilibrium value, where many good arms are known by
agents and copying always succeeds as N1 > 0.
IV. MEAN FIELD ANALYSIS FOR N,M →∞
In this section, we study the distribution of N agents in M good arms in the limit
N,M →∞. We denote the number of good arms with k agents at t asMk(t). As there are N
agents, k ∈ {0, · · · , N}. In terms of ~K(t), Mk(t) is written asMk(t) =
∑M
m=1 δKm(t),k. Mk(t)
satisfies
∑N
k=0Mk(t) = M . In terms of Mk(t), we can write N1(t) as N1(t) =
∑N
k=1Mk(t) ·k.
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The probabilistic rules for Mk by an agent action are summarized as
Pr(∆M0 = −1) = (1− x)B ·
M0
M
,
Pr(∆M0 = 0) = 1− Pr(∆M0 = −1),
Pr(∆Mk = 1) = (1− x)
(
A ·
(k − 1)Mk−1
N1
+B ·
Mk−1
M
)
,
Pr(∆Mk = −1) = (1− x)
(
A ·
kMk
N1
+B
Mk
M
)
,
Pr(∆Mk = 0) = 1− (Pr(∆Mk = 1) + Pr(∆Mk = −1)),
k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N − 1}
Pr(∆MN = +1) = (1− x)
(
A ·
(N − 1)MN−1
N1
+B ·
MN−1
M
)
,
Pr(∆MN = 0) = 1− Pr(∆MN = +1),
x ≡ N1/N.
In the rules, the terms with the coefficient A correspond to successful copying. They should
be considered to be zero if N1 = 0. N1 =
∑
kMk · k obeys the next probabilistic rule.
Pr(∆N1 = 1) = (1− x)
[
A ·
(
N1 −N ·MN
N1
)
+B ·
(
1−
MN
M
)]
,
Pr(∆N1 = 0) = 1− Pr(∆N1 = 1). (7)
By changing arms, Mk changes with the binomial probabilities B(Mk, pc/N):
Pr(∆Mk = −∆mk) =
(
Mk
∆mk
)(qC
N
)∆mk (
1−
qC
N
)Mk−∆mk
.
M0 increases by
∑N
k=1∆mk, and N1 decreases by
∑N
k=1∆mk · k.
We denote the expectation values of Mk(t) and N1(t) as mk(t) and n1(t), respectively.
The recursive relation for m0(t) is
m0(t+ 1) = m0(t)−
(
1−
n1
N
)
·
(
1−
qC
N
)
· B ·
m0(t)
M
+
qC
N
· (M −m0(t)).
The second term on the right-hand side of the equation corresponds to a decrease by random
search with the probability (1 − N1/N) · B ·M0/M . With the probability qC/N , the arm
changes to bad, and the net decrease is reduced by (1− qC/N). The third term corresponds
to the change of good arms. There are M −m0 good arms with nonzero agents, and they
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change to bad with the probability qC/N .
The recursive relations for mk, k ≥ 1 are
mk(t+ 1) =
(
1−
qC
N
){
mk(t) +
(
1−
n1(t)
N
)
(
A ·
(k − 1)mk−1(t)− kmk(t)
n1(t)
+B ·
mk−1(t)−mk(t)
M
)}
, k ∈ {1, · · · , N − 1},
mN (t+ 1) =
(
1−
qC
N
){
mN (t) +
(
1−
n1(t)
N
)(
A ·
(N − 1)mN−1(t)
n1(t)
+B ·
mN−1(t)
M
)}
.
The prefactor (1− qC/N) on the right-hand side corresponds to the changes of arms. In the
bracket {, }, the terms proportional to (1 − n1/N) correspond to a change by copying and
a random search. As qI > 0 and p < 1, we can assume that n1(t) > 0 for t > 0. At t = 0,
n1(0) = 0, and the term proportional to A should be zero. Using the above relations, we
write the recursive relation for n1 =
∑
kmkk as
n1(t+ 1) =
(
1−
qC
N
)
·
{
n1(t) +
(
1−
n1(t)
N
)(
A ·
n1(t)−NmN (t)
n1(t)
+B ·
M −mN(t)
M
)}
.
(8)
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FIG. 2. (a) Plots of p vs. γ in Eq. (10). qc = 0.1, qO = 1, and qI ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5}. (b) Plots of mk
vs. k of the numerical (symbols) and theoretical results (solid curves) from Eq. (9). qO = 1.0 and
qI = 0.5. p = 1/5, 1/3, 1/2 and γ = 3, 2, 3/2, respectively.
Here, we assume that the system is stationary for sufficiently large N . The stationary
value of n1(t)/N , which we denote x, is estimated by Eq. (4) as
x = lim
t→∞
n1(t)/N =
A+B
A+B + pc
.
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mk(t) evolves to their stationary values, and we write them asmk ≡ limt→∞mk(t). We solve
the above recursive relations by replacing mk(t + 1) and mk(t) with mk. m0 is obtained as
m0 =
M
1 + α/γ
, α ≡
B ·Nx
A ·M
, γ ≡
xqC
(1− x)(1− qC/N)A
.
mk and mN obey the following recursive relations:
mk =
(k − 1) + α
k + α+ γ
·mk−1 , mN =
(N − 1) + α
γ
·mN−1.
We obtain mk and mN as
mk =
B(k + α, γ + 1)
B(α, γ + 1)
·m0,
mN =
B(N + α, γ)
B(α, γ + 1)
·m0 =
N + α + γ
γ
·
B(N + α, γ + 1)
B(α, γ + 1)
·m0. (9)
mk, k < N obeys the Yule distribution [34, 35] (see Figure 2).
We take the limit N,M →∞ with M/N = β. γ is given as
γ =
x
1− x
·
qC
A
=
A+B
A
= 1 +
(1− p)qI
pqO
. (10)
α is also written as
α =
Bx
Aβ
.
We see that the power-law exponent for mk is given by 1 + γ.
mk ∝ k
−1−γ = k
−(2+
(1−p)qI
pqO
)
.
γ decreases with p, as in Figure 2. As γ is larger than one for p < 1 and andmN ∝ (N+α)
−γ,
mN → 0, NmN → 0 in the limit. The recursive relation for n1 in Eq. (8) then becomes an
equilibrium condition for n1 when one replaces n1(t+ 1) and n1(t) by n1 as
n1
N
=
(
1−
pc
N
)
·
{
n1
N
+
(
1−
n1
N
)
·
A +B
N
}
.
It reduces to the same equilibrium equation for x = n1/N in Eq. (3) in the limit N → ∞.
The result is consistent with the assumption that n1 converges to the stationary value.
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To estimate the sufficient system size Ns for the stationarity of the system, we decompose
the summation
∑
k for x = n1/N =
∑
k=0mkk/N in the former part for k ≤ Ns and the
latter part for k > Ns as
x =
∞∑
k=0
mkk/N =
Ns∑
k=0
mkk/N +
∞∑
k=Ns+1
mkk/N.
The latter part is then given as
∞∑
k=Ns+1
mkk/N =
B(α +Ns, γ + 1)
B(α, γ + 1)
α + γ +Ns
α+ γ
α +Ns
γ − 1
β ∝ N1−γs .
If we set Ns = 0, as x =
∑∞
k=Ns+1
mkk/N , we obtain the self-consistent equation for x,
which is the same as the equilibrium condition for n1/N in Eq. (3). For the former term∑Ns
k=1mkk/N almost coincides with x, the latter term should be almost zero. As p → 1,
γ → 1, and the convergence of the latter term to zero becomes remarkably slow. We estimate
the ratio of the latter term to x as
1
x
∞∑
k=Ns+1
mkk/N =
B(α +N, γ + 1)
B(α, γ + 1)
·
α+ γ +N
α + γ
·
α +Ns
α
≃
B(α +Ns, γ + 1)
B(α, γ + 1)
N2s .
The ratio is proportional to N1−γs , and it converges to zero in the limit Ns →∞. If the ratio
is smaller than some small value δ, Ns provides the adequate system size up to the ratio δ.
Ns is then estimated as
B(α +Ns, γ + 1)
B(α, γ + 1)
N2s = δ.
Since the left-hand side behaves as N1−γs , we have lnNs ∝ ln δ/(γ − 1).
We find that x = n1/N is given by the equilibrium value in Eq. (4), and the agent
distribution is scale-free, i.e., mk ∼ (k + α)
−(γ+1) if N > Ns. As p increases from zero to
one, x increases from qI/(qI + qC) to qO/(qO + qC). At the same time, γ decreases to one,
and the adequate system size Ns diverges. If N becomes smaller than Ns, the system is not
in equilibrium, and N1 shows strong fluctuations.
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V. PHASE TRANSITION AND ECHO CHAMBER
We estimate the fluctuation of N1 around the stationary value n1 for N > Ns. A good
arm changes to bad with the probability qC/N . If the changed arm is known by k agents,
∆N1 = −k, and ∆Mk = −1. Here, we assume that N is sufficiently large, and we can neglect
the change in Mk. We replace Mk with their expectation values mk in Eq. (9). Then, we
write the probabilistic rule for N1 ∈ [0, N ] as
Pr(∆N1 = 1) =
(
1−
N1
N
)
(A +B),
Pr(∆N1 = −k) =
qC
N
·mk.
The first equation corresponds to the action of a randomly chosen agent. If N1 = 0, we
assume Pr(∆N1 = 1) = B, as copying fails. The second equation corresponds to the
random change of arms. Here, we assume that there occurs only one arm change in Mk
arms with k agents. Since we assume N is sufficiently large, the assumption is reasonable.
The expectation value of ∆N1 is estimated as
E(∆N1) =
(
1−
N1
N
)
(A+B)−
pc
N
N1∑
k=1
mk · k.
As N > Ns,
∑N
k=1mkk ≃ Nx, and E(∆N1) vanishes for N1 < N , which we denote as N1,c. If
γ > 2, mk decays rapidly, and the contribution from the tail part in
∑N
k=1mkk is negligible.
In this case, N1,c ≃ Nx, and N1 fluctuates around Nx. However, if γ < 2, the contribution
from the tail part in
∑N
k=1mkk is not negligible. N1,c is larger than Nx.
We estimate the size of the fluctuation of N1 around N1,c. We denote the variance of N1
as VN1(N) ≡ Var(N1), where we write the system size dependence explicitly. As there are
N agents, VN1(N) is estimated by N times the variance of ∆N1. The variance of N1 per
agent is then estimated as
VN1(N)/N ≡ E((∆N1)
2) = (1−
N1,c
N
)(A+B) +
N1,c∑
k=1
mkk
2.
mk ∼ k
−1−γ , and the second term diverges as N2−γ1,c for γ ≤ 2. As N1,c ∝ N , we have the
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scaling relation for VN1(N) as
VN1(N)/N ∝


N2−γ for γ < 2,
lnN for γ = 2,
N0 for γ > 2.
(11)
If γ > 2, VN1(N)/N does not depend on the system size N and is finite in the limit N →∞.
If γ < 2,VN1(N)/N diverges as N
2−γ . For γ = 2, we see logarithmic divergence in VN1(N).
The system shows a phase transition as γ passes between the two phases with a different
asymptotic behavior for VN1(N)/N . We denote the threshold value for p as pc, which is
given by
pc =
qI
qI + qO
. (12)
If p > pc, γ < 2, and VN1(N)/N ∝ N
2−γ . If p < pc, γ > 2, and VN1(N)/N ∝ N
0. The left
figure in Figure 3 shows the phase boundary in the (p, qI) plane. We adopt qO ∈ {1, 0.5, 0.1}.
In general, pc is an increasing function of qI and a decreasing function of qO. If qI = 0.5 and
qO = 1, pc is estimated as 1/3.
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FIG. 3. (a) Phase diagram in the (p, qI) plane. Plots of pc vs. qI in Eq. (12) for qO ∈ {1, 0.5, 0.1}.
(b) Plots of r vs. p. qC = 0.1, qI = 0.5, qO = 1, β = 0.1, and N ∈ {500, 2000, 16000}. The thin
solid line corresponds to the limit behavior 22−γ for p > pc = 1/3.
To check the phase transition, we study the ratio of VN1(N)/N for N = N and N = 2N .
We denote the ratio as r.
r ≡
VN1(2N)/2N
VN1(N)/N
.
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If γ > 2, VN1(N)/N does not depends on N , and r = 2
0 = 1. If γ < 2, VN1(N) ∝ N
2−γ ,
and r = 22−γ. Figure 3(b) plots r vs. p. We adopt qI = 0.5, and qC = 0.1, qO = 1 and
β = 0.1. We have performed Monte Carlo simulations with 106 MCS. The system sizes N
are N = 5× 102, 2× 103, and 1.6× 104. If p < pc = 1/3, r is almost one, and this suggests
that VN1(N)/N does not depend on N . If p > pc, r deviates from one, which means that
VN1(N)/N depends on N . The numerical results for r almost coincide with 2
2−γ if p is not
much larger than pc and N = 1.6× 10
4. The scaling behavior for VN1(N) holds for N > Ns.
In order to check the scaling behaviors for p >> pc, it is necessary to study a system with
larger size N .
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FIG. 4. (a) Plot of pc and pEC vs. qI in the (p, qI) plane. Plots of pc vs. qI in Eq. (12) for qO = 1
in thick solid line. pEC is defined as the threshold value where E(N1/N)/x = 0.9. We adopt qc =
0.1, qI = 0.5, β = 0.1 and N ∈ {10, 20, 50}. (b) Plot of E(N1/N)/x vs. E(G) ≡ E (
∑
m(1− δKm,0)).
We adopt the same parameters with the left figure.
At last, we study the “Echo chamber” state of the system. For large p, E(N1/N) becomes
a decreasing function of p. We study how the performance of the agents is deteriorated for
large p. We define the Echo chamber state where the ratio E(N1/N)/x is smaller than 0.9.
We denote the threshold value as pEC . We numerically estimate pEC and show the results
in Figure 4a. We set pc = 0.1, β = 0.1, and N ∈ {10, 20, 50}. We see that the Echo chamber
state is in the phase p > pc, except for N = 10,M = 1, and qI ≃ 0.
In Figure 4b, we plot E(N1/N)/x vs. the average number of good arms known by agents,
which is denoted as E(G). E(G) is estimated as
E(G) ≡ E
(∑
m
(1− δKm,0)
)
.
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In the “Echo chamber” and p > pEC > pc, E(N1/N)/x is less than 0.9. In this case, as
Figure 4b shows, the average number of known good arms is less than one. This suggests
that only one good arm is shared by all agents on average in the “Echo chamber” state.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We study a simple model for social learning agents in an rMAB. There are N agents and
the bandit has M good arms that change to bad with the probability qc/N . If the agents do
not know a good arm, they look for it by a random search (with the success probability qI)
or copy the information of other agents’ good arms (with the success probability qO) with
the probabilities 1− p or p, respectively. We summarize the results below.
1. N → ∞ limit: The system is in equilibrium, and the number of agents who know a
good arm N1 is balanced with the number of the agents who do not N0. The ratio
N1/N becomes an increasing function of p for p < 1 and qI < qO.
2. M = 1 case: If N is finite, E(N1)/N decreases with p for large p. There is only one
good arm, and agents cannot find a good one after the shared good arm changes to
be bad if p is large.
3. N,M →∞ limit: The stationary distribution of agents in good arms {mk} is described
by the Yule distribution mk ∼ k
−1−γ, and γ = 1+ (1−p)qI
pqO
. N1/N fluctuates around the
equilibrium value in Eq. (4). The system shows a phase transition at pc = qI/(qI+qO),
and the asymptotic behavior of Var(N1)/N changes. If p < pc, Var(N1)/N is finite in
the limit N →∞. If p > pc, Var(N1)/N ∝ N
2−γ and diverges with N .
4. N,M < ∞ case: There is a threshold value Ns about the system size N , and Ns
behaves as lnNs ∝ 1/(1 − γ). If N > Ns, the system is in equilibrium and multiple
good arms are known by agents. E(N1)/N is almost the same as the equilibrium value.
If p < pc, Ns is small, and N > Ns usually holds. If p > pc, Ns becomes very large. If
N < Ns, all agents tend to share one good arm, as in the case ofM = 1, and E(N1)/N
decreases with p, which is the “Echo chamber” state of social learning collectives.
At last, we point out several future problems. The first problem is the empirical verifi-
cation of the predictions of the model. The model predicts that the social learning agents
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show a phase transition, and the agents distribution has a scale-free nature. In general,
the performance of agents improves with p, and the power-law exponent decreases with p.
These predictions should be studied with the tournament results [12]. Experimental study is
also an interesting research direction. Thus far, there have been some experimental studies
of human collectives in an MAB [36] and rMAB[37, 38]. In these studies, the collective
intelligence by social learning has been studied. This paper provides a new experimental
design from the viewpoint of a phase transition. The second problem is the network effect.
In this paper, we treat the case where the agents can copy any agent’s arm. In reality, agents
should have limited access to other agents, and the accessibility should be incorporated as
a network[39]. The information of an arm is transmitted over the network, and there is
a possibility of a phase with multiple arms, even for large p. As for the third problem, a
multi-armed bandit with arms having different payoffs should be studied. In the setting of
the agent tournament, the payoff obeys an exponential distribution, and an arm with high
return is rare [12]. As it is natural that an agent exploits the arm or searches for a new arm
depending on the return of his arm, the model should incorporate the exit of agents from
good arms. In an evolving network model, incorporation of the fitness of nodes leads to the
Bose condensation of edges [40]. The collective behaviors of agents in the rMAB with arms
having different payoffs might be an interesting problem.
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Appendix A: Exact Solvable M = 1 case
The Chapman–Kolmogorov equation for P (n|t) = Pr(N1(t) = n) is
P (n|t+ 1) =
∑
n′,n′′
TC(n|n′)TA(n′|n′′) · P (n′′|t),
TA(n|n′) = q(n′)δn,n′ + p1(n
′)δn−1,n′,
TC(n|n′) =
(
1−
qC
N
)
δn,n′ +
qC
N
δn,0,
p1(n) =
N − n
N
· (A · (1− δn,0) +B),
q(n) = 1− p1(n). (A1)
The initial condition is P (n|0) = δn,0. P (n|t) satisfies the following relation:
P (n|t+ 1) = (1−
qC
N
) · q(n)P (n|t) + (1−
qC
N
) · p1(n− 1)P (n− 1|t) for n ≥ 1,
P (0|t+ 1) =
qC
N
+ (1−
qC
N
) · q(0)P (0|t).
We write the stationary probability function as P (n) ≡ limt→∞ P (n|t). We solve P (0) and
P (1) as
P (0) =
qC
qC + (N − qC)B
,
P (1) =
B
A+B
·
N
a + (N − 1)
· P (0)
a =
qC
(1− qC/N)(A+B)
. (A2)
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P (n) satisfies the following recursive relation for n ≥ 2:
P (n) =
N − (n− 1)
N − (n− a)
· P (n− 1).
There is a threshold value for a. Depending on whether a > 1 or a < 1, the behavior of p(n)
changes drastically. We solve the recursive relation and obtain
P (n) =


B(N−n+a,1−a)
B(N−1+α,1−a)
· P (1) for a < 1,
B(N,a−1)
B(N−n+1,a−1)
· P (1) for a > 1,
P (1) for a = 1.
(A3)
As B(a, b) ∼ a−b,
P (n) ∼ (N − n)a−1.
We define the critical value pc for p by the condition a = 1. We obtain
pc =
qC/(1− qC/N)− qI
qo − qI
.
If p < pc and a > 1, P (n) becomes a decreasing function of n. However, if p > pc and a < 1,
P (n) becomes an increasing function of n, and P (n) has a fat tail.
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FIG. 5. Plots of P (n) vs. n in Eq. (A3). M = 1, N = 102, qc = 0.3, qI = 0.1, qo = 1, and
p ∈ {0.1, pc = 0.2232, 0.3}.
Figure 5 shows a plot of P (n) for N = 102, qc = 0.3, qI = 0.1 and qo = 1. In this case,
pc ≃ 0.2233. We choose p ∈ {0.1, pc, 0.4}. For p = 0.1 and a > 1, P (n) decreases with n. If
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p = pc and a = 1, P (n) becomes constant for n ≥ 1. If p > pc, P (n) has a peak at n = N
in addition to the peak at n = 0.
The variance of N1/N is evaluated as
V(N1/N) ≡ E((N1/N)
2)− E(N1/N)
2
=
(2 + a/N)(1 + a/N)
(a+ 1)(a+ 2)
· (1− P (0))− E(N1/N)
2. (A4)
In the limit N →∞, we obtain
lim
N→∞
V(N1/N) =
a
(a+ 1)2(a+ 2)
.
As limN→∞V(N1/N) > 0, N1/N has a wide distribution in the limit N →∞. In fact, N1/N
obeys a beta distribution beta(1, a), and the correlation coefficient among Mn is 1/(a + 2)
in thus limit [41].
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FIG. 6. Plots of V(N1/N) vs. p in Eq. (A4). qC = 0.3, qI = 0.1, qO = 1, and M = 1. N ∈
{10, 102, 104,∞}.
Figure 6 shows a plot of V(N1/N) vs. p. We adopt the same set for the parameters, as in
Figure 5. As can be clearly seen, as N increases, the curve for V(N1/N) converges to that
for the result in the limit of N →∞. We find no evidence of singular behavior in N1. This is
an artifact of the case M = 1. The agents are forced to choose the unique good arm m = 1.
With the change of the good arm, N1 changes to zero. As the result, the limiting value of
the variance of N1/N becomes finite even for p = 0. If there are many good arms, agents
can be distributed among multiple good arms. If p = 0, all agents search for a good arm
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independently, which are distributed equally among all M arms. In this case, the variance
of N1/N is proportional to 1/M
2. In the limit p → 1, all agents share the same good arm,
and the variance of N1/N becomes finite in the limit N →∞, even if M →∞. This means
that the variance of N1 per agent is finite for small p and diverges with N for large p. This
suggests that the system shows a phase transition in the limit N,M →∞.
We derive the self-consistent equation for n1, which is the limiting value of the expectation
value of N1, n1(t) = E(N1(t)).
n1 = lim
t→∞
E(N1(t)) = lim
t→∞
∑
n
P (n|t)n
We write the recursive relation for n1(t) using the relations for P (n|t) as
n1(t+1) =
∑
n
P (n|t+1) ·n =
(
1−
qC
N
)(
1−
A +B
N
)
n1(t)+
(
1−
qC
N
)
(A+B−AP (0|t)).
We solve the self-consistent equation for n1 ≡ limt→∞ n1(t) and obtain the expression in
Eq. (6).
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